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DO YOU REALLY WANT A LAWYER WHO 

DOESN'T WANT YOU? 

GABRIEL J. CHIN* 
Lawyers should be permitted to reject clients on the basis of 
sex, race, religion, national origin and sexual orientation, that is, on 
grounds which law and morality require be prohibited as selection 
criteria in virtually every other area of life. It is not that I approve 
of such discrimination; to the contrary, in my view no respectable, 
decent lawyer would discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or 
other arbitrary basis in the absence of a compelling reason. Nor am 
I unaware of the harm caused by racism and other forms of invidi­
ous discrimination in our society.1 But I believe few attorneys are 
* Assistant Professor, Western New England College School of Law. E-mail: 
gchin@aya.yale.edu. 
In this essay, I refer to the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(1969) ("MODEL CODE"), which has been adopted by many states. The Model Code is 
composed of "Canons," which are broad, general principles, Ethical Considerations 
("EC's") which are designed to explain the Canons, and Disciplinary Rules ("DR's"), 
the violation of which can give rise to disciplinary action. I also refer to the ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) ("MODEL RULES"), which many 
states have adopted in place of the Model Code. The Model Rules are composed of 
binding rules, the violation of which can give rise to disciplinary action, and official 
comments, which are guides to interpretation. 
Special thanks to Chris Iijima, who has been a valued friend as well as a thoughtful, 
generous, and frank commentator on this and other writings for the three years we have 
served together as colleagues at Western New England College School of Law. I also 
wish to acknowledge an article which cogently covers many of the issues I address in a 
slightly different context. See Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimi­
nation by Lawyers: The Legal Profession'S Response to Discrimination on the Rise, 7 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 5 (1993). 
1. Indeed, much of my professional career has been devoted to writing about the 
ugly history of racism in America. See, e.g., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITU­
TION (Gabriel J. Chin ed., forthcoming 1998); GABRIEL J. ClllN, SUM! ClIO, JERRY 
KANa & FRANK Wu, BEYOND SELF-INTEREST; ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS TOWARD A 
COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, reprinted in 3 
UCLA ASIAN-PAC. AM. L.J. (forthcoming 1998); Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: 
Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1996) [hereinafter Chin, 
The Plessy Myth]; Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration 
Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of1965,75 N.C. L. REv. 273 
(1996); Gabriel J. Chin & Denise Morgan, Breaking into the Academy: The Michigan 
Journal of Race and Law Guide to Programs for Aspiring Law Professors, 1 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 551 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimina­
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likely to discriminate,2 and any other answer would dis serve our 
system of justice without helping, and perhaps impairing, the needs 
of those seeking legal services. The ruling of the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") that attorney 
Judith Nathanson is liable for discriminating against a male would­
be client3 is a mistake. 
A minor reason the MCAD's decision is misguided is that the 
rule is unenforceable. Unlike restaurants, barber shops or apart­
ment complexes, in most law offices, there is no bill of fare listing 
standardized prices for more-or-less similar services. Accordingly, 
in law practice, unlike areas where discrimination law applies, un­
wanted clients could readily be run off by rendering a high estimate 
that is not objectively unreasonable, predicting a loss, or proposing 
an expensive strategy. Moreover, a frisson, sparks, a feeling of con­
fidence, are the critical factors a client uses in choosing counsel (the 
existence of "rainmakers"-law firm partners whose reason for be­
ing is to bring in business because of their charm, social connec­
tions, or former high government office-is conclusive proof of this 
point). A cool reception coupled with a hint of impoliteness will 
convince virtually all prospective clients that they have not yet 
found the right counsel. Finally, a persistent would-be client can be 
peremptorily rejected on the pretext that the attorney is not quali­
fied to handle the matter, that there is an actual or potential con­
flict, or that the attorney is simply too busy and thus is ethically 
required to decline the employment. While this is true with dis­
crimination in other contexts, it is not true that a renter of apart­
ments, say, will have so many pretexts that will be so readily 
demonstrated and so difficult to falsify. In many fields of law prac­
tice, each case really is materially different.4 Only those lawyers 
tion and the Constitutional Law of Immigration (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
2. We are now living under the scheme that I support. The traditional rule is that 
"a lawyer may refuse to represent a client for any reason at all [for example] because 
the client is not of the lawyer's race ...." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS 573 (1986). But cf Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyer's License to Discrimi­
nate in New York: The Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 275 (1993); Quick, supra note *, at 5-6 (noting that some jurisdictions 
are considering or have adopted antidiscrimination rules which govern client selection). 
3. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 
1997). Stropnicky was a homemaker who sought the assistance of Judith Nathanson, an 
attorney specializing in divorce work, representing women. Nathanson declined to ac­
cept Stropnicky as a client, on the ground that he was a man. 
4. As EC 2-7 explains: "The law has become increasingly complex and special­
ized. Few lawyers are willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, 
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stupid (or principled) enough to be candid are likely to be targets.5 
An additional subsidiary reason the MCAD erred is the cer­
tainty that such a rule will have paradoxical consequences if applied 
broadly. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,6 the Supreme Court held consti­
tutional a "hate crime" statute which enhanced penalties if the de­
fendant's crime was motivated by prejudice. The defendant in that 
particular case was a black man who assaulted a white victim.7 
While violence against a person of any race, religion, or gender is 
deplorable, it was a small irony that in the test case, the statute was 
used to enhance the punishment of a person who belonged to the 
very group the law was designed to protect. But Mitchell was an 
ironic exception; the statute, in time, will be applied to protect more 
people of color than it harms. 
In this context, the MCAD decision created not an ironic ex­
ception, but an ironic general rule. Here's why: Affirmative action 
notwithstanding, the American legal system has not systematically 
subordinated or ignored the needs of whites and men. Accordingly, 
it is hardly surprising that few lawyers felt the need to devote their 
practices in a formal way to the interests of whites, or to form pub­
lic interest law firms aimed at ending subordination of males.s 
and many laypersons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to 
render different types of legal services." MODEL CODE EC 2-7. 
5. In his response to this essay, Professor Iijima decries these facts, but he does 
not deny them. To the contrary, he suggests that Judith Nathanson should have in­
voked the "permissible grounds" that "she didn't like him," that she disapproved of 
"his reasons for trying to retain her," as well as the fact that her practice was aimed at 
the law's "effect and impact on women's status in society." Here, Professor Iijima sug­
gests that Nathanson invoke a pretextual reason; Nathanson's actual motivation was 
that she "did not represent men in divorce proceedings." Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 
39. His argument illustrates how likely it is that a pretext will be available in almost any 
situation. Indeed, if Professor Iijima is right, and an attorney can avoid liability simply 
by saying that they "didn't like" the client (especially in cases like this, where the lawyer 
never even talked with the client before rejecting him), then there is no possibility that 
any lawyer other than Nathanson will be subject to the rule; Professor Iijima has identi­
fied a one-size-fits-all excuse applicable to every client and every case a lawyer wishes 
to avoid. 
6. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
7. see id. at 479-80. 
8. I am not being sarcastic here. There may well be pockets in the law where men 
(or even whites) are mistreated. For example, the Supreme Court is now considering a 
statute where children born out of wedlock to female citizens are treated more favora­
bly, for immigration purposes, than children born out of wedlock to male citizens. See 
Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997). What I am saying is that while injustices 
against any group should be thought about and remedied, those against whites and 
males will be fewer in number by orders of magnitude, thus requiring fewer lawyers to 
address them, and which in any event have not resulted in systematic subordination in 
the way that white supremacy and sexism have. 
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However, virtually every lawyer has friends or classmates who went 
to law school because they wanted to help people who have histori­
cally been subordinated by law or who have had unequal access to 
the legal system. Judith Nathanson will not be alone among the 
lawyers and public interest law firms dedicated to the needs of wo­
men, members of particular races, or natives of particular countries, 
who will be sitting ducks for prosecution if this decision stands.9 
Even if progressive lawyers were not likely to be dispropor­
tionately affected, I would still question the ruling. Lawyers should 
have the right to use their lives for their private interests, that is, 
people should be allowed to choose to become political lawyers. 
While I understand and support, say, an NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, and would disdain a similar group dedicated 
to the supposed termination of white subordination, there is no rea­
son that an NAAWP LDEF should not be allowed to try to pursue 
its political agenda through law, no matter how wildly misguided it 
might be. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the prac­
tice of law "undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to 
advance" political objectives in some circumstances has First 
Amendment protection.10 
Further, I agree with Professor Harpaz that serious First 
Amendment issues arise that do not arise in other public accommo­
-dation contexts when lawyers are compelled to speak on behalf of 
clients,11 Woolworth's lunch counters and bowling alleys are not 
asked to advance (or even know about) their customers' interests as 
people. Even physicians' relationships with their patients have a 
different moral content; it would be appalling, for example, if an 
9. Professor Iijima also believes that Judith Nathanson and other progressive law­
yers should be allowed to have selective practices-that is, he agrees with me that this 
decision is wrong. If Professor Iijima favors an asymmetrical rule, that is, one permit­
ting women and people of color to discriminate against whites in the selection of clients, 
while requiring whites and men to select neutrally, in spite of certain strong reasons for 
that solution, it seems foreclosed by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995). 
10. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415 (1963). 
11. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech 
Rights ofAttorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998); cf Brenda Jones Quick, Regu­
lating a Lawyer's Discriminatory Conduct: Constitutional Limitations, 21 Omo N.V. L. 
REv. 897 (1995) (analyzing Michigan's proposed ethical rules). The analysis is differ­
ent, of course, for unlawful harassment or discrimination in employment that happens 
to be committed by an attorney. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Ander­
son, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging 
Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781 
(1996). 
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emergency room doctor chose to let a heart attack victim die un­
treated upon discovering that the patient was a tobacco executive; 
many would applaud an attorney who refused, on principle, to offer 
legal assistance to the very same executive in an emergency situa­
tion, and would find it wrong to force a lawyer to lend their skills to 
a client engaged in a cause the lawyer found immoral.12 
If the movement lawyer or the lawyer who objects to a client 
on principle are easier cases, the situation involving the unadulter­
ated racist is more difficult. What is to be done, that is, with a 
nonpolitical lawyer with a nonpolitical practice; the real estate spe­
cialist who takes every house closing that walks in the door, say, 
and has no objection to saying or writing whatever is customary, but 
only on behalf of a client who is white. Still more troubling would 
be a lawyer who rejected clients on forbidden grounds not because 
the attorney's own principles were implicated, but to satisfy the per­
ceived preferences of other clients or colleagues who would feel 
more comfortable dealing with, or being part of, a firm with a white 
or straight or male clientele. Even in these contexts, lawyers should 
be free to reject clients on discriminatory grounds. Whether or not 
a lawyer's interest in autonomy would be sufficient to justify this 
result, the legal system is interested in its own integrity, in justice, 
and thus, in preventing clients from going into cases where from the 
beginning it is clear that they are likely to be shafted. 
The relationship between lawyer and client is privileged, confi­
dential, and fiduciary.B Because a lawyer is required to "represent 
a client zealously within the bounds of the law,"14 the relationship 
is, in a real sense, intimate; even parents, priests, and physicians are 
not required to devote such single-minded dedication to those they 
are close to. A lawyer who fails "to seek the lawful objectives of 
[the] client through reasonably available means"15 has violated the 
ethical proscriptions of the profession. The drafters of the ethical 
rules made the decision that it was necessary to put in black and 
white that, for example, a lawyer may not "[k]nowingly use per­
jured testimony or false evidence."16 I doubt doctors need to be 
12. Indeed, the ethical rules provide that "representing a client does not consti­
tute approval of the client's views or activities." MODEL RULES Rule 1.2, cmt. 3. "The 
terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives ... . 
Such limitations may exclude objectives ... that the lawyer regards as repugnant ...." 
Id. cmt. 4. Even a hired gun is not necessarily available to every would-be employer. 
13. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 145-48 & ch. 6. 
14. MODEL CODE Canon 7. 
15. Id. DR 7-101(A)(I). 
16. !d. DR 7-102(A)(4). 
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reminded, say, that they should not help a patient who needs a liver 
transplant by harvesting one from a convenient passer-by. 
There are powerful reasons that both legal culture and legal 
rules impose a special duty of loyalty on attorneys towards their 
clients. One reason is that people come to lawyers for help when 
they have emergencies or problems that are difficult or consequent­
ial. When the legal profession slanders the medical profession, we 
sometimes say "at least we don't bury our mistakes." But of course, 
we do; in the context of capital cases, for example, lawyers hold the 
very lives of their clients in their handsP Even in routine civil mat­
ters, a lackadaisical lawyer can do a great deal of harm-if a lawyer 
performed a bad title search and then forgot to buy title insurance, 
if a lawyer blows the statute of limitations on a personal injury 
claim, if a lawyer ineptly defends a tort action-and individuals and 
families can be seriously damaged. Under our law, judges and ju­
ries are given ultimate power over the lives and property of Ameri­
cans, yet they have little or no independent ability to gather facts. 
The presence of a single-minded advocate for each party is the only 
thing that makes this system reasonable and possible.1s 
The other major reason that lawyers are supposed to go into 
cases with zeal is that their errors are often difficult or impossible to 
repair after the fact. In civil cases, courts staffed by judges who are 
themselves lawyers sometimes hesitate to hold a lawyer liable for 
17. Bad lawyering has killed many clients. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722 (1991) (affirming death sentence and refusing to hear claim because defend­
ant's lawyer filed notice of appeal three days late); Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 
(1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing inadequacies of 
counsel). See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence 
Not for the Worst Crime, but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). 
18. This is not always the case with the other professionals Professor Iijima men­
tions. A pharmacist, for example, while employing great learning and skill, performs 
fixed technical tasks. It involves no discretion to determine how to fill a prescription for 
100 ten milligram capsules of penicillin. Because the pharmacist ordinarily does not 
even need to see the patient (in the law, there is no analogy to the mail-order pharma­
cies which are now earning an expanded share of the market), nothing turns on good 
will or bad between the professional and the client. Moreover, if the pharmacist errs, 
that fact is readily and objectively verifiable; with very little research, even a layman can 
understand that if a prescription for Seldane is filled with Dalmane, a mistake has been 
made. Of course, a pharmacist could conceivably act with criminal malice, poisoning a 
customer because cif their race or religion, for instance, or intentionally failing to warn 
of some known hazard. But such people are beyond the reach of ethical rules, and are 
already regulated by penal law. Professor Iijima is quite right, however, when he sug­
gests that my rule would apply to psychiatrists and clergypersons, who, in my scheme, 
are more like lawyers. No rule of ethics should force a patient on a therapist who does 
not want them to get well, or a penitent on a clergyperson who wants their soul to burn 
in Hell. 
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good-faith conduct; under the "barrister rule," applicable in many 
jurisdictions, an attorney cannot be held liable for malpractice for 
an honest exercise of professional judgment.19 In addition to show­
ing what may be a high level of fault, dissatisfied clients ordinarily 
must show that they would have won (or not 10st)2° and bear the 
burden of quantifying the amount of their loss, which may be diffi­
cult to do. 
Disciplinary sanctions are also unlikely for a blunder that looks 
like it, could be a good faith mistake. Notwithstanding a duty of 
competence imposed by both the Model Code of Professional Re­
sponsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, an iso­
lated error, even a serious one, will often be overlooked. In In re 
Meyers,21 for example, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to disci­
pline an attorney who failed to appear at a scheduled hearing 
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service, citing, among 
other reasons, their observation that "most decisions and official 
ABA policy insist that a single instance of ordinary negligence is 
not a disciplinary violation. "22 
Ironically, in criminal cases, where life or liberty is in the bal­
ance, the likelihood of judicial redress for attorney error is even 
more minute.23 In some states, appointed counsel is immune from 
suit.24 In states which allow suits, the majority rule is that for a 
defendant to prevail in a malpractice claim, they must show that 
they were in fact innocent-not that they would have been acquit­
ted but for the attorney's errors, but that they did not do the 
crime.25 While relief from a conviction is sometimes possible based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel, the standard is very high, and 
even lawyers who slept through trials or showed up in court drunk26 
have been found to have been perfectly satisfactory counsel. The 
19. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
20. See, e.g., Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy v. Heasley, 328 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Iowa 
1983). 
21. 795 P.2d 201 (Ariz. 1990). 
22. Id. at 204 n.3; see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 641 A.2d 510 
(Md. 1994) (holding that "careless" failure to file necessary papers did not warrant 
discipline ). 
23. The distinguished criminal law scholar Francis Allen writes that appellate 
standards of review as applied are more lenient in civil cases than in criminal, notwith­
standing formal rules to the contrary. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGAL­
ITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 52 (1996). 
24..See, e.g., Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993). 
25. See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMIlE, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
§ 25.3 (4th ed. 1996). 
26. See Bright, supra note 17, at 1835. 
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late Jesse Romero was represented in a capital case by an attorney 
who, after thanking the jury and promising to be brief, made a plea 
for his client's life which is reprinted here in full: "You are an ex­
tremely intelligent jury. You have a man's life in your hands. You 
can take it or not. That's all I have to say."27 Even though the 
attorney never came right out and asked the jury to spare his cli­
ent's life, the Fifth Circuit found the attorney not to be ineffective.28 
Because lawyers are important, and their mistakes not easily 
rectified, the ethical norms of the profession correctly discourage 
and arguably prohibit a lawyer from taking a case where their rep­
resentation may be impaired. The Model Code states that "a law­
yer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal 
feeling ... may impair his effective representation of a prospective 
client."29 Similarly, the Model Rules provide that "a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if ... the lawyer's physical or mental condi­
tion materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the cli­
ent."30 When Judith Nathanson said to Joe Stropnicky, "you're 
better off with somebody else," she not only gave advice of great 
practical value, she also complied with a principled ethical obliga­
tion of the profession. 
It could be argued that the client should decide, that is, a client 
should be able to compel an attorney to accept a client notwith­
standing counsel's objection to the client's characteristics. The cli­
ent should be free to compromise his or her chances of winning in 
favor of what may be that client's greater interest in exposing and 
punishing discrimination. But the stakes go beyond those of the 
client's interests; the justice system has an interest in ensuring that 
parties to actions are represented by committed counsel. By way of 
analogy, some conflicts of interest between lawyer and client are 
not waivable, even if the client consents.31 
27. Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989). 
28. See id. 
29. MODEL CODE EC 2-30. 
30. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a). 
31. Professor Iijima seems to suggest that professional regulation is somehow pa­
tronizing, and that clients should be allowed to choose. Perhaps this libertarian model 
would be better-why should some distant bureaucrat or legislature require an engi­
neering degree for a bridge builder, or a bar exam for a lawyer when individual citizens 
acting in the free market are in the best position to evaluate risk and what qualifications 
they are willing to pay for; how arrogant of the law to interfere with freedom by arbi­
trarily insisting that no one, for example, may perform surgery or write prescriptions 
without some sort of medical training. Nevertheless, in a thousand ways, and for some 
powerful reasons, American law has not taken this approach. 
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Biased lawyers should not represent people for whom they 
hold an irrational hate and fear for the same reasons that biased 
judges should not preside over trials. As Justice Anthony Kennedy 
wrote as a Ninth Circuit judge, even the "slightest indication" of 
"racial bias" is enough in many cases to require recusal of a judge.32 
In Tumey v. Ohio,33 the Supreme Court held that a trial by a biased 
judge was per se reversible error, regardless of the evidence of guilt 
or of how the trial would have been different before an impartial 
tribunal. The reason for this result is obvious and applies equally to 
biased counsel: the hundreds of decisions to act or not to act, count­
less remarks made and not made, and many debatable judgement 
calls which went one way or the other, on and off the record, will 
rarely be subject to reliable post-trial scrutiny. It may be that Terry 
Lee Goodwin would have been sentenced to death even if his law­
yer had not described him to the jury as a "little old n***** bOy,"34 
and that Jose Guzmon's lawyer did his very best work even though 
he called Guzmon a "wetback" before the jury that sentenced him 
to death,35 but we can never know for sure.36 The coercive power 
of the ethical rules and the public accommodation statute should 
not be used to compel the initiation of a situation which, from the 
beginning, portends a dubious result. 
Of course, if lawyers were obligated not to discriminate and 
enjoined to take clients they did not want, they would still be sub­
ject to contractual, fiduciary, and ethical duties to act in the inter­
ests of their clients. Many or most attorneys would comply just as, 
say, conscripts in the United States armed forces typically perform 
adequately. However, as the Model Code recognizes, an attorney's 
"obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that 
arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty."37 Good 
representation cannot be forced out of recalcitrant counsel. The 
gulf between good representation and representation giving rise to 
32. United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Chin, 
The Plessy Myth, supra note 1, at 165 n.94 (citing other cases). 
33. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that due process prohibits conviction based 
on a trial presided over by a biased judge). 
34. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing 
conviction). 
35. See Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (affirming 
conviction and death sentence). 
36. The person with the best idea of what could have been done is likely to be the 
biased lawyer. The work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege may prevent 
anyone else from finding out what that lawyer knows. 
37. MODEL CODE EC 6-5. 
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disciplinary or malpractice liability is broad and deep; in that gap 
lay the wrecks of thousands of cases not only that could have been 
won, but that resulted in injustices. 
The history of the law is replete with tragedies inflicted by at­
torneys whose representation was o<;>t motivated, at least to a signif­
icant degree, whether for love or money, by a desire to aid the 
client. I am most familiar with erroneous outcomes in the context 
of criminal prosecutions, although I am sure there are examples 
from many other areas of legal practice. In the Jim Crow South, 
lawyers representing African-American men accused of rape, rob­
bery, or murder often waived appeal after a perfunctory trial, not in 
exchange for a plea bargain or some form of leniency, but just to 
move things along. Executions could come within a week of the 
alleged crime.38 While both sides of criminal practice attract some 
of the most dedicated and public-spirited attorneys, in some states, 
appointments defending criminal cases are readily available, at~ 
tracting lawyers whose dockets are not filled with private cases, yet 
fees are capped at a level low enough that some of the lawyers who 
take them are those whose reputation or ability leaves them no 
other alternative. Others feel pressure to do very little work, for 
example, pleading guilty at any excuse.39 Although not necessarily 
motivated by racism, the record of injustice caused by attorneys 
who were not committed to their clients' interests is strong reason 
not to create more such situations.40 
It may also be worth noting that discrimination claims in this 
context have important practical differences from many other kinds 
of discrimination. In most discrimination cases, the plaintiff actu­
ally wants the apartment, or the promotion which is at issue, and 
the law is intended to make biased employers, landlords, and other 
decisionmakers transact business without regard to their racism or 
sexism. Here, however, a sensible client of color who was moti­
vated primarily by a desire for legal victory would almost never 
choose to retain a racist attorney-Joe Stropnicky did not want 
38. Cf Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing conviction in one of the 
"Scottsboro Boys" cases and describing inadequacies of the trial). 
39. See, e.g., Jeff Rosenzweig, The Crisis in Indigent Defense: An Arkansas Com­
mentary, 44 ARK. L. REv. 409 (1991). 
40. A number of articles set forth chilling examples of the kind of representation 
which has been found to be constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 17; 
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The 
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HAS. 
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986). 
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Judith Nathanson after she told him she limited her practice to wo­
men but would nevertheless represent him.41 Litigation is unlikely 
to reform the souls of racist lawyers, and, I argue, the law should 
not encourage biased lawyers to accept employment where they 
could harm clients. Thus, while litigation would serve the purpose 
of exposing biased attorneys, which would help would-be clients 
steer clear, lawsuits would not serve the traditional purposes of 
achieving a substantive end for the client and reforming inappropri­
ate behavior. 
Perhaps people who cannot enthusiastically represent every 
segment of society should not be allowed to be lawyers at all. How­
ever, such a rule would generate evasion, not disbarment. More­
over, lawyers who are members of groups which have been the 
targets of discrimination, and thus have reason to resent the perpe­
trators of that discrimination, might well be disproportionately 
caught up by this rule. On a more principled basis, one of the pene­
trating insights of critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence is 
just how many thoughts which in many Americans are so deeply 
ingrained as to be imagined as facts of nature are in fact legacies of 
patriarchy and racism. If infection with invidious prejudice is dis­
qualifying, many of us may have cause to worry; none of us are 
entirely self-created, and all of us are affected by cultural beliefs 
which are not really our fault. 
This argument contains its own limiting principle. Because 
granting lawyers the right to choose is based on a desire to promote 
justice and accuracy in the system as a whole, lawyers cannot be 
allowed unfettered discretion to bow out where the system needs 
their participation. In the context of court appointments for indi­
gent clients or those otherwise unable to obtain legal services, then, 
lawyers should be subject to being drafted into service even over 
their protest. An attorney compelled to represent a client unwill­
ingly may well provide less satisfactory services than in a voluntary 
engagement, but if the alternative is no counsel at all, compelled 
counsel is the best alternative. 
The legal system would also be severely damaged if attorney 
choice led to a return to Jim Crow. We have attorney choice now 
without Jim Crow, which reassures me of the reasonableness of my 
assumption that the market for attorneys is a buyers' market. 
While the rules say that "[l]egal representation should not be de­
41. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MeAD 
Feb. 25, 1997). 
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nied to people who are unable to afford legal services,"42 many of 
those with legal needs but no money are in for a disappointing 
search for legal services regardless of their race, sex, or sexual ori­
entation. However, clients with cash, whether for a house closing 
or a tender offer, are unlikely to be refused legal services by virtu­
ally any lawyer or law firm in virtually any part of the country. 
Based on principle or political correctness, neither the newest law 
grad hanging out a shingle, nor the whitest of white shoe Wall 
Street firms is likely to believe that discouraging black, gay, or fe­
male trade will add lustre to their business reputation.43 If I am 
wrong-if homosexuals, people of color, or women with money 
have difficulty in getting representation, or if any significant 
number of attorneys, in fact, exercised their privilege to turn away 
business of the wrong hue-then it might be that the benefit to be 
gained by forcing matches between lawyer and client would be 
worth inaccuracy and injustice in some number of cases. 
At bottom, the foreseeable exceptions to the ideal of neutral 
client selection are unlikely to either limit access to legal services or 
promote segregation; the existence of lawyers who select clients 
based on political commitment has had no discern able impact on 
the availability of lawyers in the market. There will be some dis­
42. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2, cmt. 3. 
43. I have some modest and unscientific empirical support for these positions. In 
the course of preparing this essay, I spoke with a partner in a large Los Angeles law 
firm. The partner is a person of color active in civil rights work as well as litigation for 
his large corporate clients. "The way law firm economics are today," he told me, "the 
only color that matters is green. If a client has cash to pay a retainer, they can get 
representation from almost any large firm." I also spoke with a Springfield lawyer who 
was part of a small firm engaged in criminal practice. That attorney, also a person of 
color, told me that "retail" individual clients with cash would be welcomed by most solo 
practitioners or small firms regardless of their race or gender. 
A quick Westlaw search and a review of an annotated United States Code revealed 
no cases brought under 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1991), a federal civil rights statute prohibiting 
discrimination in contracting, in which a client sued an attorney for refusal to accept 
employment on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. (I found one case in which 
a lawyer sued a former client for race discrimination, see Mass v. McClenahan, 893 F. 
Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and another in which a lawyer sued an office building for 
discriminating based on the race of the lawyer's clients, see Dombrowski v. Dowling, 
459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.». I also found no cases or ethics opinions 
dealing with allegations of discrimination by lawyers in client selection decided under 
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONouer 2-400 (1994), NEW YORK JUDICIARY 
LAW DISCIPLINARY RULES 1-102(a)(6), or NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON­
ouer 8.4(g), all of which prohibit some forms of discrimination. This sketchy evidence 
suggests that either discrimination by lawyers in selection of clients is not a frequent 
problem, or, if it is, ethical rules enforced through litigation have not proved to be a 
remedy. 
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criminators, but they are better dealt with by conversion rather 
than coercion. The legal profession as an institution will decline the 
opportunity to discriminate. Allowing bigoted zealots to practice 
law does no more real harm than allowing bigoted zealots to pub­
lish or teach. Neither their numbers nor their conduct are conse­
quential enough to make us consider compromising the interest of 
the legal system in fairness and accuracy. 
